Abstract: This paper uses the transcripts from the FOMC meetings to characterize the interactions between policymakers and macro models in the formulation of U.S. monetary policy. We develop a taxonomy of these interactions and present two case studies. The first case focuses on the debate on the choice of monetary target and the second case focuses on the 1990/1991 recession. The analysis reveals that U.S. monetary policy relies on models for information. Models give estimates of both the outlook and the response of the economy to policy changes. Models also evolve to recognize the changing context in which policymakers operate % exchange rate flexibility, financial deregulation, and international trade agreements.
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Introduction
How is U.S. monetary policy formulated? The Federal Reserve Act states the goals of monetary policy by specifying that, in conducting monetary policy, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) should "promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates.'' There is, however, considerable debate among economists about translating these goals into a coherent description of U.S. monetary policy. One reason for the debate is the secrecy surrounding the details of how such policy is formulated. Detailed information about the FOMC meetings is necessary to understand the conduct of U.S. monetary policy; the FOMC transcripts offer such information. These transcripts, however, have only recently been made available to the public and we use them here to examine interdependencies between econometric models and policymakers. 1 -2 -Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs (1994).) 2 See Beckner (1996) for a journalistic narrative of the Greenspan period making use of the FOMC transcripts. 3 For more details see Federal Reserve (1994) .
To our knowledge, no one has used transcripts of past FOMC meetings to examine the interactions between model formulation and monetary policy at the Fed.
2 Several papers, including Brayton et al. (1997) , Reifschneider et al. (1997) , Duguay and Longworth (1998) , and Whitley (1998) , examine the development of models and their use in monetary policy at the Federal Reserve and at other central banks. Our paper differs from previous work by drawing on FOMC transcripts and thus offering an unprecedented look at the role of econometric models in the policymaking process.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 summarizes the structure of the FOMC and how models are used in the policy discussion. Section 3 provides a taxonomy of the interactions between policymakers and models. Section 4 deals with the role of models in the debate on disinflation. Section 5 examines the role of models in policy discussions regarding the 1990-91 recession. Section 6 gives our conclusions.
The Federal Reserve Board and the Federal Open Market Committee

Background 3
The Federal Reserve System, created in 1913, consists of the Board of Governors (Board) and twelve regional Federal Reserve Banks. The Board of Governors consists of seven members appointed by the President and confirmed by the U.S. Senate. These governors have 14-year appointments (with one appointment ending every two years), and one governor is appointed the Board's Chairman and another is appointed Vice Chairman. The Federal Open Market 5 This reporting follows The Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act (Humphrey-Hawkins Act) of 1978. This Act specifies that each February the Federal Reserve must announce publicly its objectives for growth in money and credit and that at midyear (July) it must review its objectives and revise them if appropriate. influence the level of reserves in the depository system; 2) reserve requirements --regarding the amount of funds that commercial banks and other depository institutions must hold in reserve against deposits; and 3) the discount rate --the interest rates charged to commercial banks and other depository institutions when they borrow reserves from a regional Federal
Reserve Bank. The FOMC oversees open market operations, whereas the Board of Governors 6 A third document, publicly available, is the Beigebook. For more details see Meek (1982) 7 Currently, FOMC meetings begin with one review of both foreign and domestic financial developments and the actions of the trading desk. This report is usually given by the Manager of the System Open Market Account at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. oversees reserve requirements and the discount rate.
The Structure of FOMC Meetings
Preparations for the Meeting
The FOMC policy process begins with the preparation of two key internal documents which are circulated before the meeting (see Lindsey, 1997) : The Greenbook and the Bluebook. The Greenbook contains a detailed forecast of the U.S. and foreign economies which serves as a baseline for the FOMC discussion; this forecast is the view of the Board's staff and not of the members of the FOMC. This forecast is referred to as a "judgmental'' projection because it does not rest solely on projections from any large scale econometric model. The Federal Reserve staff's models play a role, however, by (1) providing a baseline from which staff develop their judgmental Greenbook forecasts and (2) constructing alternative scenarios. The Bluebook presents the staff's view on the behavior of reserves, interest rates, and gives alternative paths for key monetary aggregates.
Presentations and Discussions at the FOMC Meeting
During the 1984-91 period, FOMC meetings began with a report by the manager for foreign exchange operations on developments and associated actions regarding foreign exchange operations. Then the manager for domestic open market operations reports on trading desk activity under the committee's instructions since the last meeting. The committee then discusses these reports and votes on approving them. Following these presentations, senior staff report on the economic outlook. The director of the Monetary Affairs division then comments on recent behavior of monetary and credit aggregates and reports on the alternative paths laid out for money growth in the Bluebook. Each alternative specifies a different growth rate for the key monetary aggregates and an associated range for the federal funds rate. Each presentation is followed by a discussion in which policymakers focus on those elements that suggest a stronger, or weaker, outcome than that projected by the Board staff. The committee's discussion gives rise to an FOMC directive over which FOMC members vote. The directive contains the instructions to the trading desk in New York for pursuing the policy objectives.
The entirety of the meeting is taped to produce a transcript which includes, as appendices, the material presented by the staff to the FOMC. Thus the transcripts are a complete official record regarding the conduct of monetary policy.
Taxonomy of the Interactions between Policymakers and Model Developments
The transcripts are simply a record of the discussion at the FOMC. Therefore we develop a taxonomy to interpret the record and assess the interactions between policymakers and model developers. There are no numbers, no test statistics, or other quantitative measures to judge the extent of interactions between policymakers and model builders. In our paper, the written word rules, but we hope to minimize the effect of our choice of words by quoting extensively so as to give the reader an opportunity to disagree with our interpretation. Moreover, the transcripts are publicly available and thus our interpretation can be challenged. Our interpretation of the official record also benefits from our direct responsibilities in developing and maintaining the international models and using them for implementing simulation scenarios during the period under examination. 
Policymakers Influencing Modeling
Policymakers can influence model building through their requests for model respecification and we group them into three categories.
Direct Requests: Policymakers are said to make direct requests for model respecification when they request that the model incorporate a certain feature: explaining a particular variable, modeling a particular transmission channel, or adding a particular country to the model. We did not find this sort of request in the FOMC transcripts.
One explanation for this absence is that the Board staff uses relatively standard models, embodying well-accepted economic relationships. Another, less obvious, explanation would involve FOMC members placing their direct requests for model changes outside FOMC sessions, which would not be reflected in the transcripts. Those requests, however, would have to be implemented at some point by the model managers and, as "model managers'' of the Multicountry model (MCM) over the period covered, we did not implement such requests, so we rule out this channel during the 1984 -1991 period. However, the absence of direct requests in these transcripts does not rule out their presence in future transcripts and, unless such possibility can be satisfactorily ruled out, we allow for them in our taxonomy.
Persuasive Requests: Policymakers are said to make persuasive requests for model respecification when their concerns involve modifying the model. As questions of this sort arise with some regularity, senior staff request research from economists to investigate them. Upon completion, the research is presented in a briefing to the Board and often is incorporated into the model(s). persuasive requests.
Idiosyncratic Requests: Policymakers are said to make idiosyncratic requests when their questions are best answered with tailor-made models. For example, the appreciation of the dollar during the 1980s generated requests for examining the predictive accuracy of alternative exchange-rate models [see Edison (1991) ].
Models Influencing Policymaking
Models can influence the conduct of policymaking by providing information. We postulate three roles depending on the effect of that information on the decision process: 10 An F in brackets denotes an FOMC member; an S in brackets denotes a staff member.
This quote suggests that the models should be used to give "a systematic feel", highlighting one role models play % influential.
The implementation of the special briefing faced two concerns. First, how to quantify the adjustment cost and its sensitivity to the time horizon. Second, how to ensure that the transmission channels embodied in the model did not assume, implicitly, the answer. Statements such as the one above suggest that these special briefings provide a venue to initiate model changes, an example of a persuasive request.
Highlights of the Special Presentation
The special FOMC presentation focused on identifying the macroeconomic consequences of stabilizing the price level by 1995 using monetary policy. To address the concerns of the FOMC on the choice of model, the Board staff used three different models in their presentation.
A first set of simulation results was based on the P-star model in which the equilibrium price level depends on M2, given velocity and output. The model suggests that prices adjust when the equilibrium price differs from the actual price level. The model, thus, can be used to solve for the path of M2 growth that yields an inflation rate close to zero. The results suggested that a five-year horizon is too short a time period to eliminate inflation gradually.
A second set of simulation results was provided using an experimental multicountry system with forward-looking expectations--MX3. Two cases, differing in the degree to which monetary policy announcements are viewed as credible by workers and firms, were examined.
In the case of high credibility, people alter their beliefs about the behavior of the central bank whereas in the weak credibility case they do not alter their beliefs. For both cases, the analysis assumed that the FOMC announces in advance its intention to slow money growth to rates consistent with attaining price stability by 1995.
A third set of simulation results was presented using the global model, FRB/GLOBAL, which combines the U.S. model (MPS model) with models for foreign economies (MCM). The structure of the combined model is similar to MX3 except that expectations are adaptive, implying the absence of credibility (see Brayton et al. 1997 for a description of the evolution of modeling at the Federal Reserve).
To compare the costs of lowering the inflation rate across models, the presentation used the "sacrifice'' ratio -a measure of the amount of excess unemployment over a period associated with each one percentage point decline in inflation. The larger the sacrifice ratio, the greater the cost for each percentage point of disinflation. The sacrifice ratio generated by the FRB/GLOBAL model was 2.2 whereas the ratio generated by MX3 ranged from 0.2 for the strong credibility to 0.6 for the weak credibility. These results suggested that the more forward-looking and flexible expectations are, the lower the costs of disinflation will be.
To give the FOMC some indication of how the sacrifice ratio would differ if economic conditions became less favorable, three alternative scenarios were considered: a weaker dollar, higher oil prices, and higher budget deficit. Relative to the base case, achieving zero inflation with the weaker dollar increases the loss of output and the sacrifice ratio (exhibit 1). Losses in the scenario of higher oil prices were reported as highest. By contrast, the budget deficit scenario yielded results similar to those of the base case.
Highlights of the Policy Discussion
The issue that received the most attention is the sensitivity of the cost of disinflation to both the policy horizon and the degree/impact of credibility. This capability, available on experimental basis in 1989, is now operational in 1997 (see Brayton et al. 1997 ). This modification of the models provides an example in which policymakers exerted a persuasive influence in the respecification of the models.
Case Study 2: Policymakers, Models, and the 1990-91 Recession
From December 18, 1990 to December 20, 1991, the discount rate declined by 350 basis points%one of the largest one-year declines in the discount rate in the postwar period. During 1991, policymakers faced: a military conflict in the Persian Gulf, the strains stemming from the disintegration of the Soviet economy, the international ramifications of German re-unification, and a recession in the United States. This section examines the role models played in this decline in interest rates.
Phase I: December 1990 -January 1991
The December 1990 FOMC meeting was concerned about the sluggish growth rates for the various monetary aggregates as well the relatively small growth rates predicted for the next two years. In that context, M2 was viewed as key policy indicator and, as the following exchange reveals, the institutional role of the model was key to the discussion:
Mr. Mullins [F] (page 28): What interest rate elasticities do we assume for money demand, roughly speaking?
Mr. Kohn [S] (page 28): I can give you some numbers on what if the funds rate changes by x basis points, that kind of thing.
Mr. Mullins [F] (page 28): Yes.
Mr. Kohn [S] (page 28): A 50 basis point decrease in the funds rate--now this is a quarterly average, so it won't show up the way it would in the monthly numbers--gets you about 3/4 point for the year, but it's loaded into the first and particularly the second quarters.
Just prior to the discussion for the vote on whether to cut the discount rate, Chairman Greenspan This remark suggests that the model, in its institutional role, estimates the systematic behavior of the economy which allows policymakers to formulate hypotheses about the unsystematic behavior and thus to craft the associated response. Specifically, when Greenspan identifies the gap between the data and the model's predictions as arising from individuals' propensity to hold risky assets, he is formulating a hypothesis which can then be used as the basis for a discussion on lowering the discount rate. The discount rate was lowered by 50 basis points immediately after the December 1990 FOMC meeting.
Immediately before the February 1991 meeting, the Board decided to lower the discount rate by 50 basis points due to the worsening of the credit situation as envisaged in the FOMC directive of December 1990. This remark illustrates the sense in which models exert an influential role. The design of the different scenarios are left to the staff, but the ultimate decisions remain with the FOMC.
Phase II: February -April
Interest rates were kept unchanged as committee members saw the economic situation as marked by ''heightened uncertainties'' and that not enough time had elapsed for the effects of the lower interest rates to be felt in the economy.
At the March meeting there continued to be uncertainty about the outlook for the economy and the FOMC examined another round of model results. The major question related to the extent to which the effects of monetary policy could be offset by the effects of the dollar appreciation that had been taking place in the first quarter of 1991. Specifically, Siegman [S] (appendix, page 4) reports that
"In order to offset the impact of a 10 percent appreciation on real GNP and bring the economy back on track by the end of the year, the staff's model suggests that U.S. short-term interest would need to decline by about 100-125 basis points by the end of 1992, depending on the pace of offsetting the impact on GNP.''
By estimating the trade-off between interest rates and exchange rates consistent with a given path of GDP, the statement reveals an instance in which the model has an influential role. Once again, interest rates were left unchanged.
However, before the next FOMC meeting on April 30th the discount rate was lowered by 50 basis points. Explaining the decision to the non-Board members of the FOMC, Chairman 
.''
Greenspan's statement suggests a disappointment with the speed of recovery or a reaction to the realization that earlier forecasts were optimistic. Though the statement does not provide unambiguous evidence of a decisive role for models, the February FOMC meeting examined model simulations (see exhibit 2) contemplating further interest-rate reductions should the economy appear weaker than what was forecasted. Though no formal statistical test exists to discriminate among the various pieces of information, the transcripts provide the closest evidence of a model exerting a decisive influence.
Phase III: May -August
The discount rate remained unchanged from May to end-August. Nevertheless, there are plenty of examples of the interaction of the FOMC and models.
At the July 1991 meeting, when members can update the targets for the monetary aggregates, attention was focused on the extent to which movements in the dollar were offsetting movements in interest rates. Specifically, exhibit 3 reports the sensitivity of the forecast to factors perceived to be contributing to the relatively slow recovery of U.S. economic activity:
The appreciation of the dollar and the weakening of foreign economic activity. One scenario that was not included among the charts, but that was discussed in the staff presentation, involved the This statement suggests that, based on the model, the lack of recovery expected by the FOMC was due to an unexpected appreciation of the dollar and the influential role of the model in its implications for interest rates is clear: They would have to decline again to offset this unexpected appreciation.
Interest in quantifying the role of the dollar in the slowing of economic recovery using The remarks from Truman illustrate the manner in which persuasive requests from policymakers lead to changes in the model. Specifically, addressing the adequacy of exchange-rate models led to permanent modifications in the exchange-rate equations of the operational models [see Edison and Pauls, (1993) ].
Phase IV: September -December
The Board lowered the discount rate by 50 basis points on September 13 th . The discussion motivating that reduction relied only on data developments and not on model predictions. Nevertheless, the magnitude of the reduction in interest rates matches closely the one that, at the February meetings, was reported as being needed (exhibit 2, scenario 1) to raise output in 1992 to the level forecasted in February of 1991.
The discount rate declined again on November 6 th by 50 basis points. Prior to this date, the FOMC had two scheduled meetings and a conference call. The first of the scheduled meetings (October 1, 1991) revealed continuing concern about the extent to which the unexpected behavior of the dollar was offsetting the easing of monetary policy. 
Conclusions
This paper shows that the conduct of U.S. monetary policy relies on models for information. Models give estimates of both the outlook and the response of the economy to policy On the whole, we conclude that far from being mechanistic providers of policy constraints, models shape and are shaped by the judgement of policymakers, at least in the conduct of monetary policy in the United States from 1984 to 1991. 
